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THE ROAD TAKEN: ROBERT A. DAHL'S
DECISION-MAKING INA DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME
COURT AS A NATIONAL POLICY-MAKER
GeraldN. Rosenberg*
One of the deep, dark secrets of the academic world is how small the
audience is for our scholarship. Most academics hope that their colleagues will
read what they write, but they know that collegiality goes only so far. There is
always the falback of assigning one's own work in class, but there is
something unsatisfying in having it read under duress. The hard truth is that
the half-life, let alone the full-life, of most scholarly articles is very short.
This may be particularly true for law review articles. In 1957, when the
Journal of Public Law published Robert Dahl's Article, l there were 259 lav
reviews, publishing multiple volumes per year, each containing multiple
articles. 2 In 2001, forty-four years later, the number of law reviews has
increased dramatically to 842.3 With several thousand law review articles
published every few months, only very few gain more than passing notice.
Despite the overwhelming number of law review articles, Dahl's DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker has
been continually read and cited, and at an increasing rate. Over the course of
its life, it has been cited hundreds of times.4 For example, in the 1960s, it was
cited at least twenty-eight times, or approximately 2.8 times per year. In the
next decade, the number of citations increased to at least forty-eight, increasing
the rate to 4.8 citations per year. In the 1980s, the Article was cited sixty-two
Jack N. Pritzker Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School,
January-May 2001; Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University (1985); J.D., University of
Michigan Law School (1983); B.A., M.A., Politics and Philosophy, Oxford University (1979); A.B.,
Dartmouth College (1976).
1 Robert A. Dah, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker,6
J. PUB. L 279 (1957) ("Decision-Makingin a Democracy").
2 See "List of Periodicals Indexed," INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (Aug. 1955-July 1958) 5-9
(Dorothea A. Flaherty ed., 1958).
3 See H.W. Wilson, Index to Legal Periodicals & Books: Journal USA, available at http://www.
hwwilson.comljournals/iilp.htm (last modified Feb. 28, 2001).
4 Citation indexes are not precise, and a manual search of the Social Science Citation Index produced
somewhat different results from a computer search. See infra note 5. However, the trends are the same.
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times, or 6.2 per year. And in the 1990s, four decades after its initial
publication, it was cited at least 125 times in scholarly articles, or
approximately 12.5 times per year. That trend held for the year 2000, in which
there were at least thirteen citations to it.5 In 1976, nineteen years after its
publication, it inspired a critical essay in the American Political Science
Review. 6 It is read and taught around the country, for example, in graduate and
law school seminars taught by Professors Lee Epstein and Jack Knight at
Washington University and by me at the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University School of Law.7
How can this be? At first glance, the Article seems an unlikely candidate
for this level of attention. It is neither lengthy nor incredibly detailed. To the
contrary, it is relatively short, covering only seventeen pages with just thirtyone footnotes, less than two per page. Was its author an eminent authority on
the Supreme Court? He wasn't. Robert Dahli, although an eminent political
theorist, was neither a lawyer nor trained as a scholar of the judiciary. This
Article was his first (and last) piece of writing on the U.S. Supreme Court. Did
the Article dazzle its readers with high-powered technical skills? Once again,
the answer is no, unless straight-forward logic, counting, and simple crosstabulations fit the definition of high-powered.
Finally, perhaps the Article was flawless? Again, the answer is no. Dahl
made several questionable assumptions, 8 excluded from his analysis a great
deal of data arguably relevant to his research question, and reached some
conclusions that were10 neither supported by the data he presented nor by the
subsequent literature. Why, then, is the Article so influential?

5 See Institute for Scientific Information, Web of Science, Citation Databases, available at
http:l/webofscience. corn (last visited Mar. 26, 2001).
6 Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 50

(1976).
7 Further, the Article played an important role, and was repeatedly cited, in a 2000 Ph.D. Dissertation on
the High Court of Argentina. Gretchen Helmke, Ruling Against the Rulers: Court-Executive Relations in
Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago)
(on file with author).

8 These include his equating of a national majority with a lawmaking majority in Congress, and his
assumption that the lawmaking majority lasts for four years after enactment of legislation. See Dahl, supra
note 1, at 284, 287.
9 See, e.g., Casper,supra note 6, at 54-60 (noting that Dahl excluded both statutory interpretation, where
the Court upholds the constitutionality of federal law but interprets it in a particular way, and decisions
invalidating state law which, like Miranda and Brown, can arguably have a major impact on national policy).
10 See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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The answer, I suggest, is three-fold. First, Dahl asks questions of
fundamental importance to the study of the Supreme Court. Most basically, he
asks what the role of the Supreme Court is, and more particularly, focuses on
whether the Supreme Court serves as a protector of minorities against
majorities. Second, the Article is careful, well thought-out, and well-written.
Its methodology is clear, its assumptions explicit, and its key decisions laid
bare for readers to challenge. Third, the points that Dahl makes can be seen as
precursors of, or contributors to, a plethora of research trajectories. In many
ways, he suggested the research road to be taken by future generations of
judicial scholars. While I will concentrate most of my remarks on this aspect
of his Article, I start with the first two points.
I.

ASKING QUESTIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE

In 1957, a typical question about the U.S. Supreme Court might be, "what
is its job, and how does it do it?" The standard answer, the legal realists to the
contrary notwithstanding, was that the Court's job was to decide cases and to
do so in such a way that provided stability in the law. Judicial decisions were
to be based on the legal texts involved, be they the Constitution or statutes, and
on the Court's past decisions. The so-called "legal process" school, emanating
from the Harvard Law School, was in vigorous health; it stressed the
importance of legal process and contrasted it to the political process of the
other branches.' 1 The Court was independent from Congress and the
Executive, enabling the Justices to focus on the legal materials before them.
The Court's job was, in a phrase, to be and act as a legal institution.
By 1957, it also seemed apparent that the Supreme Court had taken on
another role: protecting minorities against majority tyranny. Nowhere was this
clearer than in its emerging civil rights decisions of the 1940s and 1950s,
culminating, at the time Dahl wrote, in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education
12 In addition, the Court had begun to carve out a "preferred position"
decision.
13 granting constitutional protection, for example, to the refusal
for free speech,

I1 The key text of

the "school" was the never-published HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE

LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (4th tentative ed. 1958)
(unpublished manuscript); see also MORTON J. HORWrTZ, THE TRANSPORTATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-

1960, at 254 (1992); Gary Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 561, 571 (1988).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584,608 (1942), rev'don reh'g, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (Stone, J., dissenting)
('The Constitution by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms [of speech and
religion] in a preferred position."); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (recognizing
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of religious minorities to salute the flag. 14 As Dali put it, "One influential
view of the Court... is that it stands in some special way as a protection of
minorities against tyranny by majorities."'
Dahl did not jump onto the bandwagon of conventional thinking by
assuming that the Court looked only at legal materials or that it protected
minorities against majority tyranny. He saw these as questions to be
examined. As I will argue below, in conceiving of the Court as a political as
well as a legal institution, Dahl challenged conventional thinking. 6 In not
accepting conventional wisdom, in asking what the role of the Court was and
whether it protected minorities against majority tyranny, Dahl showed there
was a different way of understanding the role of the Supreme Court.
II. A CAREFUL, WELL THOUGHT-OUT, AND CLEARLY WRITTEN ARGUMENT
In order to test the claim that the Court protected minorities against
majorities, Dahl needed some way of measuring majority opinion. Given
inherent difficulties in interpreting election outcomes, and the lack of survey
research data for most of the history of the United States, Dahl concluded that
"to be at all rigorous about the question, it is probably impossible to
demonstrate that any particular Court decisions have or have not been at odds
with the preferences of a 'national majority.' ' 17 Given this, Dahl argued that
unless he made "some assumptions as to the kind of evidence one will require
for the existence of a set of minority and majority preferences in the general
population,"18 he couldn't answer the question. He then presented a key
assumption: a "lawmaking majority" in Congress could serve as a proxy for a
"national majority."'19 But congressional lawmaking majorities don't last
forever. Aware of this, Dahl made the further assumption that a lawmaking
"freedom of thought, of speech" is the "matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom").

14 See West Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), rev'g Minersville Sch. Dist.
Bd. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The Court's protection of political speech critical of the government
should not be overstated. For a critical review of its record in the context of anti-Vietnam War protests, see
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Sorrow and the Pity': Kent State, PoliticalDissent and the Misguided Worship of
The First Amendment, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ORDER IN A DEMOCRATIC

SOCIETY 17 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001).
15 Dahl, supranote 1, at 282.
16 See infra Part III.A.
17 Dahl, supra note 1, at 283.
18 Id.

19 Id. at 284.
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majority lasts for four years. 20 Finally, he divided congressional legislation
into two categories: "those involving legislation that could reasonably be
regarded as important from the point of view of the lawmaking majority and
those involving minor legislation." 21 With this framework, Dahl had a test for
the claim that the Court protects minorities. He examined what happens when
the Court invalidates both major and minor policies, controlling for the length
of time between enactment and invalidation.
One strength of this approach lies in its clarity and transparency. It is an
elegant piece of social science research. The reader can easily see what Dahl is
doing and why he is doing it, and thus can critically evaluate it. In footnotes
eleven and twelve, for example, Dahl includes the cases he coded, allowing the
interested
S22 reader to reach her own conclusion about the accuracy of his
coding. Readers can, and have disagreed with his assumption that a national
lawmaking majority lasts for four years.23 But, because he is open about
empirical problems, clear about what he is doing, and explicitly aware of the
strengths as well as the weaknesses of it, the reader is provided with the tools
necessary to make her own assessment.
Dahl's approach to the Supreme Court was empirical. That is, Dahl
understood that questions about the role of the Court were not only
philosophical and jurisprudential, but also empirical, to be tested by historical
and factual examination. Though an eminent political theorist, his initial
response to the claim that the Court protects minorities against tyrannical
majorities was to test it empirically. He wrote that this view of the role of the
Court is beset with "difficulties that are not so much ideological as matters of
fact and logic." '24 Throughout the Article, Dahl looked to see what empirical
evidence was available that might help resolve his research questions. By
bringing simple and straight-forward empirical evidence to bear on questions
Dahl demonstrated the power and importance of
of fundamental importance, 25
empirical work on the Court.
20 Id. at 287.
21 Id.

22 Id. at 287-89 nn.l 1-12.
2-' See, e.g., Casper, supra note 6, at 53, 56.
24 Dahl, supranote 1, at 283.
25 Dahl, of course, was not the first scholar to do empirical work on the Court. C. Herman Pritchett's
pathbreaking study of the Roosevelt Court was published in 1948, and the legal realists before that time had
done empirical work on trial courts. C. HERMtAN PRrrCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). For a sampling
of these legal realists' work, see WmLIAM W. FISHER Er AL., AMEiCAN LEGAL REALISM (1993); LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE (1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
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Dahl's argument is clear, as is his writing. When he writes, for example,
that the "Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national
alliance, ' 26 there is no question as to where he stands. The reader completes
the Article knowing that Dahl's answer to the question of whether the Court
can protect minorities is a clear no. The Article is also written with a style and
grace that makes it a pleasure to read, an element missing from so much
modem social science and legal writing. For example, in discussing the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices, Dahl writes that, "Presidents are not
27
famous for appointing justices hostile to their own views on public policy."
Later in the Article, Dahl addresses the claim that the Court has done more to
protect basic liberties than he has admitted. His conclusion to the discussion is
memorable: "[I]t is doubtful that the fundamental conditions of liberty in this
country have been altered by more than a hair's breadth as a result of these
decisions. However, let us give the Court its due; it is little enough. 2 s
III. DAHL As PRECURSOR OR CONTRIBUTOR
PLETHORA OF RESEARCH TRAJECTORIES

TO A

For an article to be well done, it is necessary that it ask a good research
question and attempt to answer it in a sensible and clear way. For an article to
be repeatedly cited, and for six decades and counting, it has to do more.
Decision-Making in a Democracy does more. It not only offers a vision of the
role of the Supreme Court, but in so doing, it also opens up a host of research
questions. While Dahl was not the only author to raise many of these points,
he did so in a way that caught the attention of and intrigued now several
generations of judicial scholars. The remainder of this Article highlights five
areas for which Dahl's views either set the stage, or contributed to, further
work.
A. The Supreme CourtAs a PoliticalAs Well As a Legal Actor
As I noted in the first part of this Article, when Dahl focused on the
Supreme Court the prevailing scholarly view saw the Court as a legal
institution. Conceiving of the Court as a legal institution, judicial scholars
worked within that framework, doing mostly conventional doctrinal work.
EMPIRCAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). Dahl's empirical work stood out, however, because of its simplicity and
the importance of the research question that it addressed.
26 Dahl, supra note 1, at 293.
27 Id. at 284.
2' Id. at 292.
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Dahl, however, took a different view, presented in the first two sentences of his
Article:
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal
institution is to underestimate its significance in the American
political system. For it is also a political institution, an institution,
that is to say, for
2 9 arriving at decisions on controversial questions of
national policy.

Today this point may seem so obvious as to hardly merit mention. And one
might have thought that in the wake of Brown, and the storm of criticism it
created while Dahl was writing, viewing the Court as a political institution
would have been nothing extraordinary. But it was. Dahl's claim was not
simply that the Court was a legal institution whose decisions occasionally had
political ramifications (like Brown). Rather, Dahl argued that it had to be
understood as a political institution working with legal tools.
Viewing the Supreme Court as a political institution opened up vast areas
of research. Scholars could ask not only conventional doctrinal questions
about Court decisions, but also the same sorts of questions asked about other
political institutions. In viewing the Supreme Court as a political institution,
Dahl could ask about the Supreme Court a "serious and much debated
question" asked of all political institutions:
Who gets what and why? Or in less elegant language: What groups
are benefitted or handicapped by the Court and how does the
allocation by the Court of these rewards
30 and penalties fit into our
presumably democratic political system?
These are crucial questions in understanding the role and impact of any
institution, but until Dahl's Article, they were not being asked of the Supreme
Court. For example, there was no systematic study of the impact of Supreme
Court decisions until 1969, when Theodore Becker introduced an edited
collection of implementation studies. 31 Donald Horowitz's classic argument
that courts are structurally ineffective policymakers didn't appear until 1977,32
and my work, which argued that, absent a set of unlikely conditions, the
Supreme Court is structurally constrained from furthering the interests of racial
29 Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
'0 Id. at281.
31 THE WlIPAcr OF SUPRME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STDIEs (rheodore L. Becker ed., 1969); see
also THE IMPACr OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M.
Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973).
32 DONALD L.HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLiCY (1977).
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minorities and other relatively disadvantaged groups, was not completed until
1991.33 Dahl was ahead of us all. Dahl concluded that the Court was not
effective in protecting the "fundamental conditions of liberty." 34 He went
further, concluding that, "By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the
course of national policy." 35 By viewing the Supreme Court as a political
institution, Dahl raised the question of its impact.
Similarly, there was little or no work on which "groups are benefited or
handicapped by the Court." While David Truman had raised the question of
interest group pressures on the judiciary previously, he did so in only one
chapter in a lengthy book that focused on interest groups, not courts. 36 It
wasn't until the 1960s that major works began to examine interest group
involvement with courts. 37 Again, in changing the lens through which the
Court was seen, Dahl brought these political questions to judicial scholarship.
It wasn't long after Dahl's Article appeared that Robert G. McCloskey
published The American Supreme Court. In this book, McCloskey presented
an overview of Supreme Court history, from its founding through the 1950s.
Like Dahl, McCloskey viewed the Court as a political institution. 39 The
Supreme Court has become successful, McCloskey argued, because it "learned
to be a political institution and to behave accordingly. 40 He echoed Dahl's
argument about the Court being powerless to single-handedly affect the course
of national policy, excoriating it for its decisions like Dred Scott and those

33 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
34 Dahl, supranote 1, at 292.

31 Id. at 293.
36 DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 479-

98 (1951).
37 See, e.g., CLEMENT E.VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (2d ed. 1967) (examining the litigation strategy of
civil rights groups to invalidate restrictive covenants in the transfer of residential property); Nathan Hakman,
Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisal of "PoliticalScience Folklore," 35 FORD. L. REV. 15 (1966). In
1974, Marc Galanter published his now classic study, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculationson the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 95 (1974). Twenty-five years later, Law & Society Review
revisited the issue. Special Issue, Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 803
(1999).
38 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPRE.m COURT (1960).
'9 Id. at 225.

40 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 231 (3d ed. 2000) ("MCCLOSKEY THIRD
EDITION").
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during the 1935-1937 terms when it tried to stop the New Deal.4 1 What Dahl
42
had emphasized in a short article, McCloskey ran with in a book.
B. The Relationship Between the Supreme Courtand the OtherBranches
If the Supreme Court is understood as a political institution, and as a
national policymaker, the question naturally arises as to how it relates to other
political, policymaking institutions. The conventional and classic view is that
the Court is structurally independent from the other branches of the federal
government.4 3 Indeed, the independence of the judiciary from political control
is a hallmark of the American legal system. Institutionally separate and
distinct from the other branches of the federal government, the federal
judiciary is electorally unaccountable. Federal judges and justices are
insulated from the political process through constitutional guarantees of life
appointments and salaries that may not be diminished during their terms of
office. 44 In theory, this independence, plus the power to hold legislative and
executive acts unconstitutional, allows courts to "stand as the ultimate
guardians of our fundamental rights." 45 An independent federal judiciary,
Chief Justice Rehnquist46 said in 1996, is "one of the crown jewels of our system
of government today."
Dahl did not accept these conventional claims at face value. Rather, he
investigated the relationship, asking when, and under what conditions, the
Court succeeded or failed against legislative majorities. 47 He found that the
Court was not independent from the other branches of the federal government.
Rather, he argued:
[T]he Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national
alliance. As an element in the political leadership of the dominate
alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the
alliance.45
41 Id. at 59-64, 113, 117.
42 Like Dahl's Article, The American Supreme Court, now forty-one years old, is still going strong. It
was re-issued in a second edition in 1994 and a third edition in 2000, which demonstrates its continued
importance.
43 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

44 See U.S. CONST. art. llI, § 1.
45 Charles A. Horsky, Law Day: Some Reflections on Current Proposalsto Curtailthe Supreme Court,
42 MNN. L REV. 1105, 1111 (1958).
46 Chief Justice william Rehnquist, Address at American University (Apr. 9, 1996).
47 See Dahl, supra note 1.
41 Id. at 293.
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The bulk of Dahl's empirical work supported this argument. First, he found
that the Court historically had seldom strayed from the policy wishes of the
lawmaking majority, generally failing to protect minorities against majoritarian
outcomes.4 9 As he noted, by 1957, "[i]n the entire history of the Court there is
not one case arising under the First Amendment in which the Court has held
federal legislation unconstitutional." 50 Second, he found that when the Court
did stray from the policy wishes of the lawmaking majority, Congress
overturned those decisions. In Table 6, he reported that, when the Court
invalidated major policy legislation within four years of its enactment,
Congress passed new legislation reversing the Court's opinion seventy-four
percent of the time.5 1 Under the separation of powers doctrine and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the only way for Congress to change a
Supreme Court decision invalidating a congressional act on the ground that it
violates the Constitution is to amend the Constitution. 52 But, in a stunning
rebuke to constitutional lawyers, there is no finding that congressional
reversals of Court decisions depend on whether the Court bases its original
decision on the Constitution or on statutory interpretation. Dahl suggested,
legislative majority, the Court was both
then, that in the face of a determined 53
way.
own
its
go
to
unable
and
unlikely
A careful social scientist, Dahl qualified this strong claim of judicial
dependence by suggesting conditions under which the Court might act
independently of the lawmaking majority, for example, when the lawmaking
majority was weak or in disarray. The Court, Dahl wrote, is "least likely to be
successful in blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a
major policy and most likely to succeed against a 'weak' majority; e.g., a dead
one, a transient one, a fragile one, or one weakly united upon a policy of
subordinate importance." 54 This led him to suggest room for the Court to

49 Id. at 292.

50 Id. It was not until 1965 that the Court first invalidated a congressional act on First Amendment
speech grounds. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
51 Dahi, supra note 1,at 290.
52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
53 See id. Dahl refers to the Court's invalidation of congressional attempts to ban child labor in Hammer
v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. DrexelFurniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Calling this the "most
effective battle ever waged by the Court against legislative policy-makers," he attributes it to President
Wilson's "wasted" appointment of Justice McReynolds who, if he had voted with Wilson's other appointees in
Hammer, would have provided the fifth vote to uphold the legislation. Dahi, supra note 1, at 290. In 1938,
Congress again passed legislation banning child labor. This time, the Court upheld it in United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
'4 Dahl, supra note 1, at 286.
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succeed in imposing its policies on the polity in times of transition when the
"old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of
political institutions." 55 Similarly, when the dominant coalition is:
[U]nstable with respect to certain key policies ...the Court can
intervene ...and may even succeed in establishing policy. Probably

in such cases it can succeed only if its action conforms to and
reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the
56
political leadership ....
57
This was Dahl's explanation for the "relatively successful work of the Court
in the civil rights arena. Finally, Dali suggested that the Court was like a
"powerful committee chairman in Congress" who cannot successfully oppose
the basic policies of the dominant coalition, but who can, "within these limits,
often determine
important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate
58
policy."

The questions Dahl raised about judicial independence, and the
qualifications he suggested, have been taken up by others. For example,
McCloskey reached many of the same conclusions as Dahl. McCloskey
concluded that the Court followed, rather than stood against, public opinion,
noting that it "is hard to find a single historical instance when the Court has
stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public demand." 59
McCloskey also agreed with Dahl that the Court was severely limited and had
the greatest likelihood of effectively making policy when it understood those
limits.60 "The Court's greatest successes," McCloskey wrote, "have been
achieved when it has operated near the margins rather than in the center of
political controversy,
when it has nudged and gently tugged the nation, instead
61
of trying to rule it."
Other writers took up different issues. One body of literature examines the
role of the Court in times of electoral transition.62 Another body of literature
'5 Id. at 293.

56 Id.at294.

57 Id.
58 Id.
59 MCCLOSKEY THIRD EDITION, supra note 40, at 230; see also id. at 14, 132.

'0 Id.
at 234.
61 Id.

62 See, e.g.,
David Adamany, Law and Society: Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme
Court, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 791; David Adamany, The Supreme Court's Role in Critical Elections, in
REALIGNMENT INAMERICAN POLITCS 229-59 (Bruce Campbell & Richard Trilling, eds., 1980); Paul Allen
Beck, CriticalElections and the Supreme Court, 70 Am. POL.SCI. REV. 930 (1976); Bradley Canon & S.
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examines attempts by Congress to curb the Court.63 For example, I explicitly
built upon Dahl's work, and identified nine historical periods of intense
congressional opposition to Court decisions and examined the Court's reaction.
I found that in three periods the Court reversed the decisions that upset
Congress, in three periods it ignored congressional ire and continued to decide
as before, and in three periods it trimmed its sails somewhat, effectively
splitting the opposing coalition. Congressional attacks on the Court varied in
effectiveness, depending on the number of opponents and their intensity of
feeling, the electoral victory of Court opponents, and their ability to form
coalitions. 64 By raising the question of the relation of the other branches to the
Supreme Court, Dahl showed that there were theoretically good and
empirically interesting questions to be asked and answered.
C. JudicialSelection

Dahl also wrote about the selection of Supreme Court Justices. 65 He
viewed their selection as a political process decades before the Robert Bork
confirmation battle awakened many others to this view. 66 His argument here
was simple. Because the Court was a policymaking institution, presidents
sought nominees who favored the president's policy preferences. 67 "Presidents
are not famous for appointing justices hostile to their own views on public
policy. ' 68 Dahl thus suggests that, barring mistakes in identifying nominees'

Sidney Ulmer, A Dissent,70 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1215 (1976); Richard Funston, Communication,70 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 932 (1976); Richard Funston, Reply, 70 AI. POL. SCI. REv. 1218 (1976); Richard Funston, The
Supreme Court and CriticalElections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 795 (1975).
63 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); C. HERIMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT (1961); JOHN R.
SCHMIDHASUER & LARRY L. BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS; CONFuICr AND INTERACTION,
1945-1968 (1972); Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and Judicial
Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 LAw & Soc'y REV. 309 (1980).
64 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of PoliticalPower, 54 REV. POL. 369
(1992).
65 Dahl, supra note 1, at 289.
66 In 1987, President Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Lewis Powell. Seen as an outspoken conservative by many, women's groups and civil rights groups
quickly mobilized to fight the nomination. Soon they were joined by a host of environmental, health, labor,
and consumer groups, ranging from Common Cause and the Sierra Club to Planned Parenthood and the
National Mental Health Association. The confirmation battle made use of modem political campaign tools
including polling, television ads, and mass mailings. After lengthy and acrimonious confirmation hearings, the
Senate voted down the nomination by a vote of 58-42. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE
BORK NOmINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
67 Dahl, supra note 1, at 284.
68 id.
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policy preferences, the views of the President on the key issues of the day
would be reflected on the Supreme Court. But unlike so many current pundits,
Dahl celebrated the political nature of the selection process. "[I]f justices were
appointed primarily for their 'judicial' qualities without regard to their basic
attitudes on fundamental questions of public policy," Dahl wrote, "the Court
could not play the
69 influential role in the American political system that it does
in reality play."
It was in large part because of the political nature of the appointment
process that Dahl believed that the Court was part of the dominant political
coalition. To test this, Dahl examined the average length of time between
appointments. He found that, on average, one new Justice was appointed every
70
Thus, a new President, on average, would have two
twenty-two months.
Court appointments in his first term, and four over two terms. This number of
appointments, Dahl reasoned, should be enough to create a Court majority
congenial to the policy aims of the President. Consequently, the Court was
likely to be part of the dominant political coalition simply because a majority
of its members were appointed by that coalition. As Dahl put it, "the policy
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the7 1policy
views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States."
D. The PoliticalNature of JudicialDecisionmaking
How do courts reach decisions? The conventional view in the 1950s, and
today, is simple and straightforward: judges read the legal texts in question,
apply precedent, reason by analogy, and reach a decision that, if not compelled
by this legal method, is strongly indicated by it. Based on this view, research
into judicial decisionmaking involves purely legal analysis. Dahl, however,
took another view. Decisionmaking by the Court, he argued, was political as
well as legal. First, it was political because the Court was a policymaker
weighing different policy alternatives. Second, and importantly, decisionmaking by the Supreme Court was political because of the indeterminancy of
legal sources. There were cases, he wrote, in which "strictly legal criteria are

'9 Id. at 285.
70 Id.at 284.
71 Id. at 285. The numbers have changed somewhat since Dahl wrote. From 1957, when Dahl wrote, to
the present, eighteen Justices have been appointed (Vhittaker through Breyer). This works out to one new
Justice every thirty months. Thus, a one-term president should be able to make one or two appointments,
while a two-term president should have three or more.
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inadequate.'
He expanded this point, noting that "[v]ery often" there are
cases in which
[C]ompetent students of constitutional law, including the learned
justices of the Supreme Court themselves, disagree; where the words
of the Constitution are general, vague, ambiguous, or73 not clearly
applicable; where precedent may be found on both sides.
This is a problem, Dahl suggests, to those who insist on viewing the Court as
only a legal institution:
If the Court were assumed to be a "political" institution, no particular
problems would arise, for it would be taken for granted that the
members of the Court would resolve questions of fact and value by
introducing assumptions derived form their 74
own predispositions or
those of influential clienteles and constituents.
Viewing the Court as a political institution, Dahl argued that judicial decisionmaking was influenced by nonlegal factors. In reaching decisions, the Court,
Dahl concluded, "cannot act strictly as a legal institution." The Justices "must
... choose among controversial alternatives of public policy by appealing to at
least some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value
that cannot be
75
found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution."
Dahl's view of judicial decisionmaking as value-driven was more than
three decades ahead of its time. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a flurry of
political science writing on judicial decision-making emerged that came to be
called the "attitudinal model. 76 Proponents of this model argued that in
deciding cases judges select outcomes that are closest to their preferred policy
preferences and then make use of precedent and legal reasoning to justify
them.7 7 Based on this view, the legal method is simply a smokescreen for
disguising the policy preferences of judges. While Dahl did not do any of this
work, he set forth its basic assumptions.

72 Id.at 281.
71 Id. at 280.

74 Id.
75 Id.at281.
76 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATlTUDINAL MODEL

(1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, IdeologicalValues and the Votes of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices,
83 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
CourtJusticesRevisited, 57 J. PoL. 812 (1995). For an argument that judges must act strategically rather than
vote their sincere policy preferences, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
77 Id.
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E. Legitimacy and the Symbolic Meaning of Supreme CourtAction
The Supreme Court, in Dahl's opinion, was best understood as a political
institution that was part of the dominant national alliance. Moreover, it had
limited powers and was more akin to a powerful congressional committee chair
than a co-equal branch of government. But it did have some power. The
source of that power, Dahi suggested, was the "unique legitimacy attributed to
its interpretations of the Constitution."78 The Court could jeopardize its
legitimacy, however, "if it flagrantly opposes the major policies of the
dominant alliance," a course, Dahl argued, it was unlikely to follow. 7 9 Its
"main task," Dahl argued, was "to confer legitimacy on the fundamental
80
policies of the successful coalition."
This was a striking claim for both normative and empirical reasons.
Normatively, one of the strongest defenses for allowing a non-electorally
accountable Court to invalidate the acts of democratically accountable
branches is that the Court acts on constitutional principle, not partisan
preference.81 Its decisions, on this claim, carry a heightened sense of
legitimacy when compared to the decisions of the elected branches because
they are mandated by the Constitution. Thus, Dahl focused on an issue of
fundamental importance for assessing the role of the Court. But the claim was
also striking because, unlike for any other claim in the Article, Dahl did not
provide even a shred of evidence for it. Further, it appears to contradict his
primary claim that the Court is a political institution, part of the dominant
political alliance.
The question of the Court's legitimacy has continued to attract scholarly
attention. The evidence, although not decisive, does not support Dahl's claims.
If the Court has a heightened legitimacy then one might expect its decisions to
be implemented smoothly. One need only note that at least some controversial
Supreme Court decisions, such as Brown and Roe v. Wade were and are
opposed by large segments of the population and were and are unevenly
implemented. Similarly, if the Court has a heightened legitimacy, one might
expect it to be able to change people's opinions as the Court informs them of
what the Constitution requires. Here, too, there is not much evidence that
78 Dahl, supra note 1, at 293.
79 Id.

"' Id. at 294.
81 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward:The Formsof Justice,93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979).
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Court decisions on controversial issues change many minds. 82 In fact,
evidence suggests that Americans' view
of the Court is driven by their
83
substantive agreement with its decisions.
The positive relationship often asserted between Court decisions and
legitimacy depends on a level of public knowledge about the Court that may be
missing. That is, for the public to grant legitimacy to Court decisions, the
public has to both believe that the Court is a proper, impartial, and competent
interpreter of the Constitution and know about its decisions. While this does
not seem an onerous responsibility, surveys have consistently shown that only
about forty percent of the American public, at best, follows Supreme Court
actions, as measured by survey respondents having either read or heard
something about the Court. In 1966, for example, despite important Supreme
Court decisions on race, religion, criminal justice, and voting rights, fifty-four
84
percent of a nationwide sample could not recall any recent Court decisions.
More recently, in April 1975, the Gallup Organization asked two questions on
knowledge of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions. Although the questions
were asked only about two years after the decisions, Judith Blake found that
"less than half of American adult respondents were informed about the 1973
decisions." 85 By 1982, almost a decade after the decisions, little had changed.
When a national sample was asked whether there was a Supreme Court
decision forbidding or permitting a woman to obtain an abortion during the
first three months of pregnancy, fifty-nine percent of the respondents replied
"no" or "don't know." The lack of knowledge about even landmark Supreme
Court decisions like Roe v. Wade8 7 makes claims about the Court's heightened
legitimacy problematic.
82 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Irrelevant Court: The Supreme Court's Inability to Influence Popular
Beliefs About Equality (orAnything Else), in REDEFINING EQUALITY 172-190 (Neal Devins and Dave Douglas
eds., 1998).
83 See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS (1973); cf. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sd. 635 (1992). It is too early to say anything definitive about the public's
reaction to Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). However, a December 2000 Gallup Poll showed a sharp, forty
percent increase in the percentage of Republican identifiers responding that they have "A Great Deal" or

"Quite a Lot" of confidence in the Supreme Court, and a drop in the percentage of Democratic identifiers
similarly responding. Gallup Organization, Opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Has Become More Politicized
(Jan.3, 2001), availableat http://vww.gallup.comlpolllreleases/prOI0103b.asp.
84 MURPHY ET AL., supra note 83, at 53.
85 Judith Blake, The Supreme Court's Abortion Decisionsand Public Opinion in the United States, 3

PoP. & DEv. REV. 45,57-59 (1977).
86 Americans Evaluate the CourtSystem, PUB. Op., Aug./Sept. 1982, at 24, 25.
87 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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Finally, the claim of heightened legitimacy rests on the public believing
that the Court is a proper, impartial, and competent interpreter of the
Constitution. On this score, the evidence is not helpful. In 1968, Murphy and
Tanenhaus found that only 12.8% of the American public was aware of even
major Court decisions, accepted constitutional interpretation as a proper role
for the Court, and regarded the Court as carrying out its responsibilities in an
impartial and competent manner.88
The point, however, is not so much whether Dahl's claims about the
Court's legitimacy were correct. Rather, by raising the issue Dahl reminded
readers of its importance.
IV. CLOSING COMMENTS
In the preceding pages I have tried to convey a sense of why DecisionMaking in a Democracy has been such an influential piece of scholarship. I
credit its success to three main factors: its asking questions of fundamental
importance to the study of the Supreme Court; its careful, well thought-out,
empirical methodology presented in an exceedingly well-written way; and its
raising a host of questions that subsequent scholars have addressed. In these
ways, Dahl showed us the road to take in examining the role of the Supreme
Court in the American polity.
Throughout his career, Dahl also showed those who knew him an
additional road to take. In honoring Dahl's Article, we celebrate not only an
extraordinary piece of scholarship, but also an extraordinary scholar and
person. Nice guys, Leo Durocher once reputedly said, finish last. Dahl proves
him wrong. I had the privilege of taking a graduate seminar from Dahl,
serving as one of his teaching assistants, and working with him on the early
stages of my dissertation. Dahl was revered by Yale graduate students who
knew him not only for his scholarship (which this edition of the Emory Law
Journalcelebrates), but also for his gentleness, his humility, and his decency.
For many Yale graduate students, Dahi was important not merely as a scholar,
but also as a model of the kind of professor we all wanted to be.

88 Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court: A Preliminary
Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor CourtLegitimation of Regime Change, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 357, 359,
377-78 (1968); see alsoAdamany, Law and Society, supra note 62, at 807 (arguing for the "Court's incapacity
to legitimize governmental action").
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Toward the end of the Article, Dahl writes: "By itself, the Court is almost
powerless to affect the course of national policy." s9 I'm fairly sure that he is
correct in this claim. Even so, Robert Dahi not only powerfully affected the
careers of several generations of Yale graduate students, but also the course of
research and commentary by future judicial scholars.

89 Dahl, supranote 1, at 293.

HeinOnline -- 50 Emory L. J. 630 2001

